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On the Performance of Adaptive Packetized
Wireless Communication Links under Jamming
Koorosh Firouzbakht, Guevara Noubir, Masoud Salehi
Abstract—We employ a game theoretic approach to formulate
communication between two nodes over a wireless link in the
presence of an adversary. We define a constrained, two-player,
zero-sum game between a transmitter/receiver pair with adaptive
transmission parameters and an adversary with average and
maximum power constraints. In this model, the transmitter’s
goal is to maximize the achievable expected performance of
the communication link, defined by a utility function, while the
jammer’s goal is to minimize the same utility function. Inspired
by capacity/rate as a performance measure, we define a general
utility function and a payoff matrix which may be applied to
a variety of jamming problems. We show the existence of a
threshold (JTH) such that if the jammer’s average power exceeds
JTH, the expected payoff of the transmitter at Nash Equilibrium
(NE) is the same as the case when the jammer uses its maximum
allowable power, Jmax, all the time. We provide analytical and
numerical results for transmitter and jammer optimal strategies
and a closed form expression for the expected value of the game at
the NE. As a special case, we investigate the maximum achievable
transmission rate of a rate-adaptive, packetized, wireless AWGN
communication link under different jamming scenarios and show
that randomization can significantly assist a smart jammer with
limited average power.
Index Terms—Jamming, Rate Adaptation, Game Theory,
Wireless Communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the last decades, wireless communication has beenestablished as an enabling technology to an increasingly
large number of applications. The convenience of wireless and
its support of mobility has revolutionized the way we access
information services and interact with the physical world.
Beyond enabling mobile devices to access information and
data services ubiquitously, wireless technology is widely used
in cyber-physical systems such as air-traffic control, power
plants synchronization, transportation systems, and human
body implantable devices. This pervasiveness has elevated
wireless communication systems to the level of critical in-
frastructure. Radio-frequency wireless communications occur
over a broadcast medium, that is not only shared between
the communicating nodes but is also exposed to adversaries.
Jamming is one of the most prominent security threats as it
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not only can lead to denial of service attacks, but can also be
a prelude to spoofing attacks.
Anti-jamming has been an active area of research for
decades. Various techniques for combating jamming have been
developed at the physical layer which include directional
antennas, spread spectrum communication and power/modula
tion/coding control. At the time, most of wireless systems were
neither packetized nor networked. Reliable communication in
the presence of adversaries has regained significant interest in
the last few years, as new jamming attacks as well as need
for more complex applications and deployment environments
have emerged. Several specifically crafted attacks and counter-
attacks have been proposed for packetized wireless data net-
works [1], [2], [3], [4], multiple access resolution [5], [6],
[7], [8], multi-hop networks [9], [3], broadcast and control
communication [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], cross-
layer resiliency [17], wireless sensor networks [18], [19],
spread-spectrum without shared secrets [20], [21], [22], and
navigation information broadcast systems [23].
Nevertheless, very little work has been done on protecting
rate adaptation algorithms against adversarial attacks. Rate
adaptation plays an important role in widely used wireless
communication systems such as the IEEE 802.11 standard
as the link quality in a WLAN is often highly dynamic.
In recent years, a number of algorithms for rate adaptation
have been proposed in the literature [24], [25], [26], [27],
[28], [29], [30], [31], and some are widely deployed [32],
[33]. Recently, rate adaptation for the widely used IEEE
802.11 protocol was investigated in [34], [35]. Experimental
and theoretical analysis of optimal jamming strategies against
currently deployed rate adaptation algorithms indicate that the
performance of IEEE 802.11 can be significantly degraded
with very few interfering pulses. The commoditization of
software radios makes these attacks very practical and calls
for investigation of the capacity of packetized communication
under adaptive jamming.
In this work, we focus on the problem of determining the
optimal transmission strategies and adaptation mechanisms
for a transmitter/receiver with multiple transmission choices/
parameters (multiple transmission rates, different transmission
powers, etc) when the wireless channel is subject to jamming
by a power constrained jammer. We consider a setup where
a pair of nodes (transmitter and receiver) communicate using
data packets. An adversary can interfere with the communica-
tion but is constrained by an instantaneous maximum power
per packet (Jmax) as well as a long-run average power (Jave).
Packets each selected with appropriate transmission param-
eters, either overcome the interference or are lost otherwise.
Inappropriate selection of the transmission parameters can
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Fig. 1. The system model; packetized communication link under jamming
either increase the chance of underperforming (if the param-
eters are selected conservatively) or loosing a packet (if the
parameters are selected aggressively). In this communication
scenario, it is crucial to understand the interaction between
the communicating nodes and the adversary, determine the
long-term achievable maximum performance and the optimal
transmitter strategy to achieve it, as well as the optimal strategy
for the adversary. While, for a channel with fixed-power jam-
mer, the optimal strategies for communication and jamming
and the system performance are derived from the fundamental
information theoretic results (See Section V), these questions
are still open for a packetized communication system.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We formulate the interaction between the communicating
nodes and an adversary using a game-theoretic frame-
work. We show the existence of the Nash Equilibrium
(NE) for this non-typical constrained zero-sum game.
• We show that the standard information-theoretic results
for a jammed channel correspond to a pure NE.
• We further characterize the game by showing that, when
both players are allowed to randomize their actions (e.g.,
coding rate and jamming power) a new NE appears
with surprising properties. We show the existence of a
jamming threshold (JTH) such that if the jammer average
power exceeds JTH, the game value at the NE is the same
as the case when the jammer uses Jmax all the time.
• We provide analytical results for the optimal NE strate-
gies and the expected value of the game at NE as a
function of jammer’s average power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we introduce and define our model for the communication
link in an adversarial setting. In Section III, we formulate
the interactions between the communicating nodes and the
adversary as a constrained two-player zero-sum game and
define a general utility function and a payoff matrix which
are applicable to a variety of jamming problems. Additionally,
we discuss how the additional constraint on jammer’s average
power makes our game model different from a typical zero-
sum game. In Section IV, we show the existence of the NE for
our constrained zero-sum game. We also prove the existence
of the jamming threshold and its effect on the game outcome.
In Section V, we provide analytical results for the players’
optimal strategies and the game value at the NE when the
jammer’s average power takes different values. In section VI
we derive analytical and numerical results for two special
cases when the utility functions and payoffs are defined as
the AWGN channel capacity. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section VII.
Fig. 2. Transmitter model
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we formally define the problem under study.
The corresponding system model is shown in Figure 1. The
transmitter and the receiver are communicating through a
packetized, wireless noisy channel. Beside the channel noise,
the transmitted packets are also disrupted by an adversary, the
jammer. The jammer’s maximum and average jamming powers
are assumed to be limited to Jmax and Jave, respectively.
A. The Channel Model
The wireless communication link between the transmitter
and the receiver is assumed to be a single-hop, noisy channel
with fixed and known channel parameters. Furthermore, the
communication link is being disrupted by an adversary ,
the jammer. The jammer transmits radio signals to increase
the effective noise at the receiver and hence degrades the
performance of the communication link (e.g., to decrease
the channel capacity or throughput, degrade the quality of
service, etc.) between the transmitter and the receiver. We
assume packet-based transmission, i.e., transmissions occur in
disjoint time intervals (time slots) during which transmitter’s
and jammer’s state (parameters) remain unchanged.
In Section III we introduce and study a constrained two-
player zero-sum game between the transmitter-receiver pair
and the jammer in which the goal of the transmitter-receiver
pair is to achieve the highest performance (e.g., channel
capacity, channel throughput, etc.) while the jammer tries to
minimize the achievable performance.
B. The Transmitter Model
The transmitter has an adaptation block which enables
him to change and adapt his transmission parameters (e.g.,
transmission power, rate, modulation, etc.). In order to combat
jamming, the transmitter changes his transmission parameters
according to a probability distribution (his strategy). The
transmitter chooses an optimal distribution to achieve the
best average performance (or his expected payoff) which is
presented by a preference/utility function. Common measures
of performance in wireless networks are achievable capacity,
network throughput, quality of service (QoS), power consump-
tion, etc. [36]. As stated before, we assume transmissions are
packet-based. The transmitter’s model is shown in Figure 2.
The interleaver block in transmitter’s model is a counter-
measure to burst errors and burst jamming (transmitting a burst
of white noise to disrupt a few bits in a packet). Interleaving is
frequently used in digital communications and storage devices
to improve the burst error correcting capabilities of a code.
Burst errors are specially troublesome in short length codes as
they have limited error correcting capabilities. In such codes,
a few number of errors could result in a decoding failure or
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an incorrect decoding. A few incorrectly decoded codewords
within a larger frame could make the entire frame corrupted.
Combining effective interleaving schemes such as cryp-
tographic interleaving and capacity-achieving codes, such
as turbo and LDPC codes, results in effective transmission
schemes (see [2]) which make burst jamming ineffective.
Therefore, in our study we do not consider burst jamming.
C. The Jammer Model
Radio jamming or simply jamming is deliberate transmis-
sion of radio signals with the intention of degrading perfor-
mance of a communication link. A fairly large number of
jamming models have been proposed in the literature [37]. The
most benign jammer is the barrage noise jammer. The barrage
noise jammer transmits bandlimited white Gaussian noise with
power spectral density (psd) of J . It is usually assumed that the
barrage noise jammer power spectrum covers exactly the same
frequency range as the communicating system. This kind of
jammer simply increases the Gaussian noise level from N to
(N + J) at the receiver’s front end. Another frequently used
jamming model is the pulse-noise jammer. The pulse noise
jammer transmits pulses of bandlimited white Gaussian noise
having total average power of Jave referred to the receiver’s
front end. It is usually assumed that the jammer chooses the
center frequency and bandwidth of the noise to be the same as
the transmitter’s center frequency and bandwidth. The jammer
chooses its pulse duty factor to cause maximum degradation
to the communication link while maintaining the average
jamming power Jave. For a more realistic model, the pulse-
noise jammer could be subject to a maximum peak power
constraint. Other jamming models, to name a few, are the
partial-band jammer and single/multiple-tune jammer.
We study a more sophisticated jamming model. The jammer
in study is a reactive jammer, i.e., he is only active when a
packet is being transmitted and silent otherwise. We assume
that the jammer uses a set of discrete jamming power levels
arbitrary placed between J = 0 and J = Jmax. The jammer
can choose any jamming power level to increase the effective
noise at the receiver, but he has to maintain an overall
average jamming power, denoted by Jave. The jammer uses his
available power levels according to a probability distribution
(his strategy), he chooses an optimal strategy to minimize
the performance of the communication link while maintaining
his maximum and average power constraints. As shown in
Section II-B, burst jamming is not an optimal jamming scheme
and hence, we assume that the jammer remains active during
the entire packet transmission, i.e., the jammer transmits a
continuous jamming signal with a fixed power (variance)
J ∈ [0, Jmax] for each transmitting packet.
III. GAME MODEL
In this section we formulate the jamming problem intro-
duced in section II in a game-theoretic context. We introduce
the players, their respective strategies and define a general
utility function and payoff matrix that could be used as a
measure of performance in a wide rang of jamming problems.
At the physical layer, the interaction between the legitimate
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND PARAMETERS
Notation Description
Jave, JTH Jammer’s average power, jamming thresholdJ , JT Jammer’s and transmitter’s action sets
J(NJ+1)×1 Jamming power vector
x(NT+1)×1 ∈ X Transmitter’s mixed-strategy
y(NJ+1)×1 ∈ Y Jammer’s mixed-strategy
X,Y Mixed-strategy sets
Z, Z(NT+1)×1 Transmitter’s payoff matrix and payoff vector
Z(x,y), Z(Jave) Expected payoffs
users (the transmitter-receiver pair) an the adversary (the
jammer) is often modeled as a zero-sum game in order to
capture their conflicting goals [36]. We use the two-player
zero-sum game framework to model the problem with the
additional constraint that the jammer must maintain an overall
average jamming power. We show how this additional con-
straint affects jammer’s mixed-strategy set and makes the game
model different from a typical zero-sum game.
A. The Mixed-strategy Sets
The jammer has the option to select its operating power in
any given packet from the set of discrete values of available
jamming powers, arbitrarily placed between 0 and Jmax. We
assume (NJ + 1) distinct power levels, or pure strategies, are
available to the jammer (the size of the jammer’s action sets).
In the most general case, the jammer’s action set is a set of
different jamming power levels in the interval
[
0, Jmax
]
. We
denote this set by J
J =
{
0 ≤ Jj ≤ Jmax, 0 ≤ j ≤ NJ and Jj 6= Jk for j 6= k
}
Without loss of generality, we assume the power levels are
sorted in an increasing order and
{
0, Jmax
} ⊂ J , i.e.
J0 = 0 < · · · < Jj < · · · < JNJ = Jmax 0 < j < NJ
For simplicity, we place the possible jamming power levels in
a vector and form the jammer’s pure strategy column vector,
J , where
JT =
[
J0 · · · Jj · · · JNJ
]
1×(NJ+1) (1)
and T indicates transposition. Unlike typical zero-sum games
in which there are no other constraints on the mixed-strategies,
in our model, the jammer’s mixed-strategy must satisfy the
additional average power constraint Jave, where Jave ≤ Jmax.
Hence, in our constrained game model, not all mixed-strategies
(and not even those pure strategies that are greater than Jave)
are feasible strategies [38]. If we let y denote the jammer’s
mixed-strategy vector1 and let Y be the standard (NJ+1)-
simplex, for a typical zero-sum game, we have the following
relations
yT = [ y0 ... yj ... yNJ ] ∈ Y :
NJ∑
j=0
yj = 1
yj ≥ 0
0 ≤ j ≤ NJ
(2)
1The probability distribution vector on the set of jammer’s pure strategies.
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By using the jammer’s pure strategy vector we define the new
mixed-strategy set, YLE|Jave , for our constrained game as
YLE|Jave = {y ∈ Y
∣∣ yT · J ≤ Jave} (3)
where YLE|Jave is a subset of the (NJ+1)-simplex which in-
cludes all mixed-strategies with an average power less than or
equal to Jave.
Since by introducing the new constrained mixed-strategy
set, defined in equation (3), we are eliminating some mixed-
strategies that could have been otherwise selected, we must
first establish the existence of the Nash equilibrium for this
game model. This game is not a typical zero-sum game with
a finite number of pure strategies for which the existence of the
NE is guaranteed. In section IV-A, we prove the existence of
the NE for the constrained game, where the jammer’s mixed-
strategy set is limited to YLE|Jave .
The transmitter’s pure strategy set, or equivalently his action
set, is a set of (NT +1) discrete transmission parameters (e.g.,
power, rate, etc.). We assume each strategy from transmitter’s
action set can withstand up to a certain level of jamming
power, we indicate this jamming power level by JT to dis-
tinguish it from the jammer’s actual jamming power, J . We
assume the packet that is being transmitted with this strategy
can be fully recovered at the receiver for any jamming power
less than or equal to JT but will be completely lost for jam-
ming powers greater than JT . This assumption is inspired by
Shannon’s channel capacity theorem which states that reliable
communication at a given rate is possible when the noise
power is below a certain level and becomes impossible if the
noise power exceeds that value. Since corresponding to each
transmitter pure strategy there exists a certain jammer power
below which reliable transmission is possible, we can define
a one-to-one relation between transmitter pure strategies and
corresponding jammer power levels JT (also, see Section III-B
for more explanation about this assumption). We choose to use
these jammer power values as representatives of transmitter’s
pure strategies. As a result, the transmitter’s pure strategy set
can be defined as
JT =
{
0 ≤ JT,i ≤ Jmax, 0 ≤ i ≤ NT
}
(4)
WLOG, we assume JT,0 = 0 and JT,NT = Jmax, i.e., the
transmitter’s highest and lowest payoffs correspond to the
jammer’s lowest (J = 0) and highest (J = Jmax) jamming
powers. The transmitter’s uses his available transmission pa-
rameters (or the equivalent jamming powers from the set JT )
according to a probability distribution (his mixed-strategy) and
his goal is to find an optimal strategy to maximize the expected
performance of the communication link. We use column vector
x, to indicate the transmitter’s mixed-strategy vector.
xT =
[
x0 . . . xi . . . xNT
]
1×(NT+1) ∈ X (5)
where X is the standard (NT+1)-simplex.
B. The Utility Function and The Payoff Matrix
Because transmissions occur in the presence of an adver-
sary, recovery of the transmitted information/packets at the
receiver is not always guaranteed. Since each strategy from
the transmitter’s action set can sustain up to a certain level of
jamming power, denoted by JT , packets can be recovered only
when the actual jamming power, J , is less than or equal to
JT , i.e., if and only if J ≤ JT . Therefore, the utility function
of the game (the payoff to the transmitter), Z(JT , J), can be
modeled as
Z
(
JT , J
)
=
{
Z(JT ) JT ≥ J
0 JT < J
JT ∈ JT , J ∈ J (6)
where Z(JT ) represents the payoff of the communication link
under jamming. The function Z(JT ) assigns a positive value to
each strategy from the transmitter’s action set and is intuitively
a strictly decreasing function of JT , i.e., the payoff to the
transmitter decreases when the jamming power increases, i.e.
Z0 > · · · > Zi > · · · > ZNT ; 0 < i < NT (7)
where Zi
∆
= Z(JT = Ji) and Ji ∈ JT . Even though Z(JT )
could be any arbitrary decreasing function of JT , defining
Z(JT ) based on the channel capacity is a common practice
in the games involving a transmitter-receiver pair and an
adversary [39], [40], [41], [36].
Given that our game model is a constrained zero-sum two-
player game, the payoff to the jammer is the negative of
the transmitter’s payoff. Furthermore, we can formulate the
payoffs (for each pure strategy pair) in a payoff matrix where
the transmitter and the jammer would be the row and the
column players respectively. The resulting payoff matrix, Z,
is in general a non-square matrix and from equation (6), we
see that the non-zero elements of each row of Z are equal. We
will show in Lemma 1 that WLOG, we can assume that Z is
a square, lower triangular matrix with equal non-zero entries
in each rows, i.e.,
Z(NT+1)×(NT+1) =
[ Z0 0 ·· 0
: :
Zi ·· Zi 0 ·· 0
: :
ZNT ·· ZNT ·· ZNT
]
(8)
and the expected payoff of the game for the mixed-strategy
pair (x,y) is
Z(x,y) = xTZ y,
y ∈ YLE|Jave
x ∈ X (9)
Lemma 1. Let Z be the payoff matrix in the constrained two-
player zero-sum game defined by the utility function (6). The
payoff matrix obtained by removing the dominated strategies is
a square lower triangular matrix with size less than or equal
to min
{
NT , NJ
}
.
Proof: See [40] Section 3.3.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, we need to consider only
square matrices, which simplifies further development. In the
next section we will study the outcome of the game under
jammer’s different values of average power. WLOG, in the
following sections, we assume the size of Z matrix is NT +1.
IV. GAME CHARACTERIZATION
In this Section, we study two basic properties of the
game. We will show that although we have put an additional
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constraint on the jammer’s mixed-strategy set, the existence
of Nash Equilibrium is still guaranteed.
Additionally, we show that by randomizing his strategy,
the jammer can force the transmitter to operate at the lowest
payoff, given that the average jamming power exceeds a
certain threshold, JTH < Jmax. We will also derive an upper
bound for this jamming power threshold.
A. Existence of the Nash Equilibrium
For every zero-sum game with finite set of pure strategies,
there exists at least one (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium (NE)
such that no player can do better by unilaterally deviating from
his strategy [38]. In our game model, we are assuming an
additional constraint on the jammer’s mixed-strategy set; the
jammer must maintain a maximum average jamming power.
This additional assumption changes the jammer’s mixed-
strategy set from a standard n-simplex to a subset of it.
Therefore, the existence of the NE for this non-typical zero-
sum game must be established. In the following lemma,
we show that the existence of the NE under the additional
constraint is guaranteed.
Lemma 2. For the constrained two-player zero-sum game
defined by the utility function Z (JT , J), given in (6), and
the payoff matrix Z, given by (8), there exists at least one NE
in the form of transmitter’s mixed-strategy, x ∈ X, and the
jammer’s mixed-strategy, y ∈ YLE|Jave .
Proof: See Appendix B.
B. Existence of Jamming Power Threshold
The following theorem proves the existence of a jamming
power threshold and gives an upper bound for it. In Section V
we use the Theorem 1 to derive the optimal mixed-strategies
for the transmitter and the jammer in the general case.
Theorem 1. Let us assume we have a constrained two-player
zero-sum game defined by the utility function Z(JT , J), given
in (6), the payoff matrix, Z, given in (8), the transmitter’s
mixed-strategy x ∈ X, and the jammer’s mixed-strategy y ∈
YLE|Jave , given in (3). Then, there exists a jammer threshold
power JTH, 0 < JTH < Jmax such that, if Jave ≥ JTH then,
there exists y∗ ∈ YLE|Jave and
x∗
T
=
[
01×NT 1
]
1×(NT+1)
Z(x∗,y∗) = ZNT
(10)
Where x∗,y∗ are the transmitter’s and jammer’s optimal
mixed-strategies, respectively, and Z(x∗,y∗) is the game
value at the NE (we use these notations throughout the paper).
Theorem 1 states that there exits a jamming power thresh-
old, JTH, such that if the jammer’s average power exceeds JTH
then the transmitter’s optimal mixed-strategy is to use the
strategy corresponding to jammer’s maximum power, resulting
in lowest payoff; as if the jammer was using its maximum
jamming power all the time.
Proof: Assume the jammer is using a mixed-strategy, y˙,
which is not necessarily optimal, and is defined by
y˙T =
[
y˙0 0 · · · 0 y˙NT
]
1×(NT+1)
= ZNT
[
Z−10 0 ··· 0
(
Z−1
NT
−Z−10
) ] (11)
It can easily be verified that (11) is indeed a valid probability
distribution (since by assumption we have ZNT < Z0). Let
J˙ave be the average jamming power of the strategy y˙;
J˙ave =
NT∑
j=0
y˙jJj =
(
1− ZNT
Z0
)
Jmax < Jmax (12)
Furthermore, assume the transmitter is using an arbitrary
mixed-strategy x ∈ X against jammer’s strategy y˙ defined
in (11). Define Z(x, y˙) to be the expected payoff of the game
for the mixed-strategy pair (x, y˙);
Z(x, y˙) = xTZ y˙ = ZNT
[
(x0 + xNT ) +
NT−1∑
i=1
(
Zi
Z0
)
xi
]
≤ ZNT (x0 + xNT ) ≤ ZNT (13)
Since by assumption we have ZiZ0 < 1 for all 0 < i ≤ NT and
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ NT . Additionally, the equality in
(13) holds if and only if x0 + xNT = 1 Thus, by using the
mixed-strategy, y˙, and an average power J˙ave ≤ Jmax given
in (12), the jammer can force a payoff at most equal to the
transmitter’s lowest payoff, ZNT .
The jamming power given in (12) is not necessarily the
lowest possible threshold. In section V-B we provide a closed
form expression for the lowest average jamming power, JTH,
(jamming threshold) that can force the payoff ZNT .
V. GAME ANALYSIS
In this section we study the optimal strategies for the
transmitter and the jammer. We divide this section into two
subsections; the case where the average jamming power is
less than the jamming threshold as defined in Section IV, and
the case where it is greater than or equal to the jamming
threshold. As we will show in Appendix B, the standard
linear programing techniques that are used to solve standard
two-player zero-sum games can be appropriately modified
to solve two-player zero-sum games with linear constraints.
Therefore, even though all the results in this section are derived
analytically, all constrained two-payer zero-sum games can
also be solved numerically.
A. Optimal Mixed-Strategies for Jave < JTH
We start by developing the optimal strategies for specific
values of average jamming power, denoted by Jave,m, m =
0, · · · , NT − 1. As we will show, for these specific average
jamming powers, the expected payoff of the game at the NE
is equal to Zm, m = 0, · · · , NT − 1. Later we extend our
analytic results to the case where average jamming power is
not necessarily equal to Jave,m.
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1) Jave = Jave,m < JTH, for some m = 0, · · · , NT − 1:
Since the average jamming power is less than the jamming
threshold, the expected value of the game at the NE is in the
interval (ZNT , Z0]. Assume, for now, the average jamming
power, Jave < JTH, is such that the optimal strategy for the
jammer is to use (m + 1) of his pure strategies (the support
set of the jammer’s mixed-strategy is y0 ≤ y ≤ ym), i.e.,
yT = [y0 . . . yj . . . ym 01×(NT−m)]1×(NT+1) (14)
where 0 ≤ m < NT and 01×(NT−m) indicates a row vector
of (NT −m) zeros. Intuitively, as the jammer’s average power
increases, he is able to use pure strategies with higher jamming
power. Define the mixed-strategy of the jammer, ŷ, as
ŷT = Zm [ Z
−1
0 ··· Z−1j −Z−1j−1 ··· Z−1m −Z−1m−1 01×(NT−m) ] (15)
It can be easily verified that (15) is indeed a probability
distribution. The average power corresponding to ŷ is
Jave,m
∆
= JT ŷ = Zm
m∑
j=1
(
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
)
Jj (16)
Assume the jammer is using the mixed-strategy ŷ against
the transmitter’s arbitrary distribution, x ∈ X. The resulting
expected payoff of the game is
Z
(
x, ŷ
)
= xTZy = Zm · xT

1(m+1)×1
Zm+1Z
−1
m
...
ZjZ
−1
m
...
ZNT Z
−1
m

≤ Zm (17)
Since Zi < Zj for i > j, it is clear from (17) that the optimal
strategy for the transmitter, against ŷ , is to use at most the
same number of pure strategies, (m+ 1), i.e.
xT =
[
x0 . . . xi . . . xm 01×(NT−m)
]
1×(NT+1) (18)
any strategy other than (18) results in a lower expected payoff
for the transmitter.
Since ŷ given in (15) is not necessarily an optimal mixed-
strategy for the jammer, the optimal strategy would result in an
expected payoff less than Zm. Therefore, Zm can be used as an
upper bound for the game value at NE and all mixed-strategies
with average jamming power Jave = Jave,m. We present this
fact in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Assume the jammer’s average power is given by
(16). Then for the constrained two-player zero-sum game
defined in theorem 1, the following inequality holds
Z
(
x∗,y∗
) ≤ Z(x, ŷ) ≤ Zm Jave = Jave,m∀x ∈ X (19)
As discussed above, the optimal strategy for the transmitter
against ŷ is to use, at most, (m+ 1) of his strategies. Define
the mixed-strategy x̂ for the transmitter as
x̂T =
[
x0 · · · xi · · · xm 01×(NT−m)
]
=
[
b0Z
−1
0 · · · biZ−1i · · · bmZ−1m 01×(NT−m)
] (20)
where selection of bi’s will be discussed later. Since x̂ is a
probability distribution, we have
m∑
i=0
xi =
m∑
i=0
biZ
−1
i = 1 bi > 0 i = 0, . . . ,m (21)
Assume the transmitter is using the mixed-strategy x̂, which
is not necessarily optimal, against jammer’s arbitrary strategy
y ∈ YLE|Jave . The expected payoff of the game would be
Z
(
x̂,y
)
= x̂TZ y = y0
m∑
i=0
bi + · · ·+ yj
m∑
i=j
bi + . . . ymbm
= B
m∑
j=0
yj −
(
y0b0 + · · ·+ yj
j−1∑
i=0
bi + · · ·+ ym
m−1∑
i=0
bi
)
(22)
where B =
∑m
i=0 bi. Since we assumed Jave < JTH, a rational
jammer would use all his available power, i.e.
JTy =
m∑
i=1
Jjyj = Jave where
y ∈ YLE|Jave
J1 < · · · < Jj < · · · < Jm
Let the sum of the terms in the parentheses in relation (22) be
proportional to the jammer’s average power, i.e.,
j−1∑
i=0
bi = d · Jj i = 0, . . . ,m− 1 where d > 0
⇒ bi = d(Ji+1 − Ji) i = 0, . . . ,m− 1
(23)
then (22) becomes independent of jammer’s strategy and the
expected payoff of the game is
Z
(
x̂,y
)
= x̂TZy =
m∑
i=0
bi − dJave
=bm + d (Jm − Jave)
∀y ∈ YLE|Jave
(24)
It is clear from (24) that a rational jammer should use all his
available power, Jave, to achieve the lowest possible expected
payoff against x̂. If we substitute bi’s from (23) in (21)
we have
bmZ
−1
m + d
m−1∑
j=0
(Jj+1 − Jj)Z−1j =1
bm + dZm
(
m−1∑
j=0
Jj+1Z
−1
j −
m−1∑
j=0
JjZ
−1
j
)
=Zm
bm + dZm
(
m∑
j=1
JjZ
−1
j−1 −
m∑
j=1
JjZ
−1
j + JmZ
−1
m
)
=Zm
bm + d
(
Jm −
m∑
j=1
(
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
)
Jj
)
=Zm
and finally from (16)
bm + d(Jm − Jave,m) = Zm (25)
If we substitute Jave with Jave,m in (24) and use (25) we have
Z
(
x̂,y
)
= bm+d(Jm−Jave,m) = Zm ∀y ∈ YLE|Jave,m (26)
Since x̂ given in (20) is not necessarily an optimal mixed-
strategy, using the optimal strategy for the transmitter would
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result in an expected payoff greater than Zm. Therefore, Zm
could be used as a lower bound for the game value at the NE
and all mixed-strategies with average jamming power Jave =
Jave,m. We present this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Assume the jammer’s average power is given by
(16). Then for the constrained two-player zero-sum game
defined in theorem 1, the following inequality holds
Z
(
x∗,y∗
) ≥ Z(x̂,y) ≥ Zm Jave = Jave,m∀y ∈ YLE|Jave,m (27)
However, from lemma 3 and for Jave = Jave,m we know
the game value cannot be more than Zm and hence the game
value at the NE is indeed Zm and x̂ and ŷ given in (20) and
(15) are optimal mixed-strategies for the transmitter and the
jammer, respectively. Since by assumption, m < NT , we have
Jm+1 ∈ J , therefore we can let
bm = d (Jm+1 − Jm) (28)
and from (26) we have
d =
Z −m
Jm+1 − Jave,m
bi =
Ji+1 − Ji
Jm+1 − Jave,mZm
for
0 ≤ m < NT
i = 0, . . . ,m
(29)
substituting (29) in (20), the transmitter’s optimal mixed-
strategy becomes
x̂ =

x0
...
xi
...
xm
0NT−m)×1
 = ZmJm+1−Jave,m

(J1−J0)Z−10
...
(Ji+1−Ji)Z−1i
...
(Jm+1−Jm)Z−1m
0NT−m)×1
 (30)
We summarize the results derived so far in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider the constrained two-player zero-sum
game defined by utility function (6), payoff matrix (8), and
transmitter and jammer mixed-strategy sets X and YLE|Jave,m ,
defined in (5) and (3), respectively. Then, the expected value
of the game at the Nash-Equilibrium is
Z
(
x∗,y∗
)
= Zm
and Jave,m is given by
Jave,m = Zm
m∑
j=1
(
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
)
Jj 0 ≤ m < NT
Furthermore, x∗ and y∗ are given by (30) and (15), respec-
tively.
If we define the effective jamming power, Jeff, to be the
jamming power a reactive non-strategic jammer (i.e., a jammer
that uses only pure strategies) would need to force the same
operating point at the NE (Zm in this case) then, the effective
jamming power becomes
Jeff = Jm > Jave,m for 0 < m < NT (31)
which means that randomizing helps the jammer to achieve the
same performance as the reactive non-strategic jammer with
less average jamming power.
2) Optimal Strategies for the General Case: Now that
we have established the optimal mixed-strategies for Jave =
Jave,m, we consider the more general case where the jammer’s
average power is not necessarily equal to Jave,m for some
0 ≤ m < NT . Obviously we have Jave,m ≤ Jave < Jave,m+1
for some m ∈ {0, . . . , NT − 1}. Let
Jave = Jave,m + ε = Zm
m∑
j=1
(
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
)
Jj + ε
for some m ∈ {0, . . . , NT − 1} (32)
Define the mixed-strategy ŷ for the jammer as
ŷ = a · Zm

Z−10
...
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
...
Z−1m − Z−1m−1
ŷm+1
0(NT−m−1)×1

(NT+1)×1
(33)
Since ŷ is a probability distribution we have
m+1∑
j=0
yj = aZm
(
Z−1m + ŷm+1
)
= 1⇒ a = 1
1 + Zmŷm+1
(34)
and from (33) we can rewrite the expression for the jammer’s
average power as
Jave =
m+1∑
j=1
yjJj = aJave,m + aZmŷm+1Jm+1
from (32)⇒ aJave,m + aZmŷm+1Jm+1 = Jave,m + ε
(35)
and hence a and ŷm+1 become
ŷm+1 =
Jave − Jave,m
Jm+1 − Jave Z
−1
m and a =
Jm+1 − Jave
Jm+1 − Jave,m (36)
Assume the jammer is using the mixed-strategy given in (33)
against the transmitter’s arbitrary strategy. Then the expected
payoff of the game is
Z
(
x, ŷ
)
= aZmx
T
 1(m+1)×1Zm+1Z−1m ŷm+1
...
 = Jm+1−JaveJm+1−Jave,mZm
(37)
Where we have used the fact that a rational transmitter would
only use up to (m + 1) of his strategies since otherwise
the expected payoff of the game would be even less. As
before, since ŷ is not necessarily an optimal mixed-strategy,
the corresponding expected payoff can be used as an upper
bound for the game and hence, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let us assume that the jammer’s average power,
Jave, satisfies Jave,m < Jave < Jave,m+1 for some m ∈
{0, . . . , NT − 1}. Then for the constrained two-player zero-
sum game defined in theorem 1, and for all x ∈ X the
following inequality holds
Z
(
x∗,y∗
) ≤ Z(x, ŷ) ≤ Jm+1 − Jave
Jm+1 − Jave,mZm (38)
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TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
Z
(
x∗,y∗
)
= x∗TZy∗ = Jm+1−Jave
Jm+1−Jave,mZm Jave,m ≤ Jave < Jave,m+1 Jave,m = Zm
∑m
j=1
(
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
)
Jj m = 0, · · · , NT − 1
Transmitter’s Optimal Mixed-Strategy Jammer’s Optimal Mixed-Strategy
x∗ =

x0
...
xi
...
xm
0

(NT+1)×1
= Zm
Jm+1−Jave,m
 (J1 − J0)Z
−1
0:
(Ji+1 − Ji)Z−1i:
(Jm+1 − Jm)Z−1m
0
 y∗ =

y0
...
yj
...
ymym+1
0

(NT+1)×1
=
Jm+1−Jave
Jm+1−Jave,mZm

Z−10 :
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
:
Z−1m − Z−1m−1
Jave−Jave,m
Jm+1−Jave Z
−1
m
0

where ŷ is given in (33).
Now assume the transmitter is using the same mixed-
strategy given in (20). From (24) and (29) we have
Z
(
x̂,y
)
= bm + d (Jm − Jave) = d (Jm+1 − Jave)
=
Jm+1 − Jave
Jm+1 − Jave,mZm
(39)
which is the same expression for the upper bound of the
game derived in Lemma 5. As a result we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider a constrained two-player zero-sum
game defined by utility function (6), payoff matrix (8), and
transmitter and jammer mixed-strategy sets X and YLE|Jave
given in (5) and (3), respectively. Assume the jammer’s aver-
age power Jave satisfies
Jave,m < Jave < Jave,m+1 for some m ∈ {0, . . . , NT − 1}
(40)
Then, the expected value of the game at the NE is
Z
(
x∗,y∗
)
=
Jm+1 − Jave
Jm+1 − Jave,mZm (41)
where x∗ and y∗ are the transmitter’s and the jammer’s
optimal mixed-strategies, respectively, and Jave,m is given by
(16). Furthermore, x∗ and y∗ are given by (30) and (33),
respectively.
B. Optimal Mixed-Strategies for Jave ≥ JTH
Let us assume in lemma 3 we let m = NT , then we have
Z
(
x∗,y∗
) ≤ ZNT Jave = Jave,NT∀x ∈ X (42)
Since the game value cannot be less than ZNT , we conclude
that Z
(
x∗,y∗
)
= ZNT . But from theorem 1 we know that
for Jave ≥ JTH the game value at NE is also ZNT and since
Jave,NT is the smallest average jamming power for which the
game value at NE is equal to ZNT , we conclude that JTH =
Jave,NT . We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Consider the constrained two-player zero-sum
game defined by utility function (6), payoff matrix (8), and
transmitter and jammer mixed-strategy sets X, and YLE,
defined in (5) and (3), respectively. Then, there exists a
jamming power threshold, JTH < Jmax, such that
Z
(
x∗,y∗
)
= ZNT ∀Jave ≥ JTH
where the value of JTH is given by
JTH = ZNT
NT∑
j=1
(
Z−1j − Z−1j−1
)
Jj Jj ∈ J (43)
Furthermore, the jammer’s optimal mixed-strategy with the
lowest average power, that can achieve the NE is given by
y∗
T
= ZNT
[
Z−10 ··· Z−1j −Z−1j−1 ··· Z−1NT−Z
−1
NT−1
]
1×(NT+1)
In other words, if the average jamming power exceeds
JTH given by (43), then the optimal strategic jammer (i.e.,
the jammer which uses optimal mixed-strategy) can force the
expected payoff equal to the transmitter’s lowest payoff at the
NE. This expected payoff is equal to the reactive non-strategic
jammer with average power Jmax, i.e., Jeff = Jmax > JTH.
VI. SPECIAL CASE; AWGN CHANNEL CAPACITY AS THE
UTILITY FUNCTION
In this section we study two typical jamming scenarios and
we show that the framework defined in previous sections can
be used to determine the optimal transmission and jamming
strategies. Even though our analytical results are not limited
to the AWGN channel, for simplicity, we use the packetized
AWGN channel model and we assume packets are long enough
that channel capacity theorem could be applied to each packet
being transmitted.
A. Special Case I: A Transmitter with Fixed Rates
In this section we study a special case of the game defined
in the previous sections. We assume the communication link
between the transmitter and the receiver is a sing-hop, pack-
etized (discrete-time), AWGN channel with fixed and known
noise variance, N . The communication link is being disrupted
by an additive adversary. We assume the jammer is an additive
Gaussian jammer with flat power spectral density. It can be
shown [42] that in the AWGN channel with a fixed and known
noise variance, an iid Gaussian jammer is the most effective
jammer in minimizing the capacity between the transmitter
and the receiver. The effect of the Gaussian jammer on the
communication link is reduction of the effective signal to
noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver from PTN to
PT
N+J , where
J represents the jammer power (variance) and PT is the
transmitter power.
The transmitter has a rate adaptation block which allows
him to transmit at (NT + 1) different but fixed rates according
to the system’s design specifications. Any rate other than
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these given rates is not a feasible option for the transmitter.
Additionally, the transmission rates are bounded between
a minimum and a maximum transmission rate denoted by
Rmin and Rmax, respectively, i.e., Rmin ≤ Ri ≤ Rmax for
i = 0, . . . , NT . Without loss of generality, we assume the
rates are sorted in a decreasing order. Hence, the transmitter’s
action set becomes
R = {R0=Rmax>···>Ri>···>RNT =Rmin} (44)
The transmitter’s goal is to maximize the achievable expected
transmission rate over the channel. Assuming that transmission
at channel capacity is possible, and from the capacity of
discrete-time AWGN channel, the transmission power must
at least be equal to
Rmax = R0 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N
)
(nats/transmission)
⇒ PT = N
(
e2R0 − 1) (45)
Throughout the rest of this section, we assume transmission at
channel capacity and the transmission power is fixed and given
by (45). Given that the channel noise variance is assumed to
be fixed and known, corresponding to each transmission rate
Rj ∈ R there exists a certain jammer power, Ĵj ≥ 0, below
which reliable transmission is possible, i.e.
Rj =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + Ĵj
)
; j = 0, . . . , NT
⇒ Ĵj = N e
2R0 − e2Rj
e2Rj − 1 ; j = 0, . . . , NT
(46)
With this notation, we can define a one to one correspondence
between transmitter rates and jammer power levels. Therefore,
we can use Ĵj given in (46) and/or Rj for j = 0, . . . , NT to
refer to transmitter strategies interchangeably.
Assume the jammer’s goal is to force the transmitter to
operate at his lowest rate, RNT , while keeping the lowest
possible average and maximum jamming power. As a result
of Lemma 1, the jammer does not need to use more strategies
than the transmitter i.e., he only needs (NT + 1) jamming
power levels. Consider the following action set for the jammer
J =
{
J0, J1, . . . , Jj , . . . , JNT
}
(47)
Jj =
{
0 j = 0
Ĵj−1 + δN = N
(
δ + e
2R0−e2Rj−1
e2Rj−1−1
)
j = 1, . . . , NT
The term δN with δ > 0 is an extra added jamming
power to the non-zero jamming powers to make sure that
Rj−1 is greater than channel capacity for the jamming power
Jj . Since the transmitter’s goal is to achieve the maximum
possible expected transmission rate and the jammer’s goal is
to minimize the same expected value, we can define the utility
function based on the capacity of the discrete-time AWGN
channel, i.e.
C
(
Rj , Jj
)
=
{
Rj Ĵj ≥ Jj
0 Ĵj < Jj
Rj ∈ R and Jj ∈ J (48)
The utility function defined in (48) has the same format of
the general utility function defined in (6) and it can be easily
verified that the Rj as defined in (46) is a strictly decreasing
function of j, or equivalently Ĵj . Hence, we can directly
apply Theorem 4 to find the minimum average jamming power
or the jamming power threshold, JTH. Substituting (46) and
(47) in (43) and simplifying the result, the jamming threshold
becomes
JTH = RNT
NT∑
j=1
(
1
Rj
− 1
Rj−1
)
Jj = Nδ
(
1− RNT
R0
)
+NRNT
NT∑
j=1
[(
1
Rj
− 1
Rj−1
)
e2R0 − e2Rj−1
e2Rj−1 − 1
]
(49)
and the jammer’s optimal mixed-strategy with the minimum
average jamming power that achieves the NE is given by
y∗
T
= RNT [R
−1
0 ··· R−1j −R−1j−1 ··· R−1NT−R
−1
NT−1 ]1×(NT+1)
(50)
We define the jammer’s randomization gain to be the power
advantage that he gains for switching from pure-strategies (i.e.,
reactive non-strategic jammer) to optimal mixed-strategies.
With this definition, the randomization gain becomes the ratio
of the jammer’s pure strategy power (Jmax in this case) over
the average power of the optimal mixed-strategy that forces
the same expected payoff at the NE, i.e.
Randomization Gain =
Jmax
JTH
=
JNT
JTH
> 1 (51)
To provide a numerical example, assume, a single-hop
jamming resilient communication system that uses the typical
rates of the IEEE 802.11x standard i.e., the available coded
data rates of the communication system are
Ra =
{
54, 51, 48, · · · , 12, 9, 6
}
(Mb/s) (52)
Figure 3(top) shows the randomization gain of the optimal
jammer as a function of the expected transmission rate at the
NE for this example. The figure is sketched for continuous
AWGN channel and typical values of N and δ. For this typical
example, the randomization gain of the jammer is
3 dB ≈ 1.8 ≤ Randomization Gain ≤ 16 ≈ 12.5 dB (53)
Figure 3 (top) also provides a comparison between the reactive
non-strategic jammer and the optimal strategic jammer. As
expected, the optimal strategic jammer requires less average
power than the reactive non-strategic jammer to force the same
expected rate at the NE. Figure 3 (bottom) shows a typical
optimal transmission strategy for the transmitter in this case.
B. Special Case II: Equally Spaced Jamming Powers
Consider a communication link with the same setup defined
in section VI-A. Assume the jammer is using (NT+1) discrete
jamming power levels equally spaced in the interval [0, Jmax],
i.e., the jammer’s action set is
J =
{
Jj =
j
NT
Jmax; 0 ≤ j ≤ NT
}
(54)
The transmitter has a rate adaptation block which allows
him to transmit at any arbitrary rate. Assume the transmitter’s
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Jave < JTH (bottom).
goal is to maximize the achievable expected transmission
rate over the discrete-time AWGN channel. As a result of
lemma 1, the optimal strategy for the transmitter is to use,
at most, (NT + 1) rates where each rate corresponds to one
of the jammer pure strategies. Assuming that transmission at
the AWGN channel capacity is possible, we can define the
achievable transmission rate based on the discrete-time AWGN
channel capacity when the signal to noise ratio PTN is replaced
by the signal to noise plus jamming power ratio PTN+Jj . In this
case, the transmitter’s action set becomes
R =
{
Ri =
1
2 log
(
1 + PT
N+ iNT
Jmax
)
0 ≤ i ≤ NT
}
(55)
In this special case, the jamming power set representing the
transmitter’s action set, JT , is identical to the jammer’s action
set, JT = J . Since the transmitter’s goal is to achieve the
maximum expected transmission rate over the channel, we can
define the utility function of the game based on the AWGN
channel capacity, i.e.,
Z
(
JT
)
= R
(
JT
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + JT
)
JT ∈ J (56)
Given that at rates higher than capacity reliable commu-
nication is impossible and since R
(
JT
)
defined in (56) is a
strictly decreasing function, the framework defined in section
III can be applied to this special case. Thus, the results derived
in section V can be used to determine the optimal strategies
and the expected value of the game at NE.
Assuming the jammer’s average power, Jave, satisfies Jave,m
≤ Jave < Jave,m+1 for some m = 0, · · · , NT − 1, the optimal
mixed-strategies for the transmitter and the jammer simplify
to
x∗
T
=
(
m∑
i=0
R−1i
)−1 [
R−10 ··· R−1i ··· R−1m 01×(NT−m)
]
y∗ = [(m+1)−NT JaveJmax ](
∑m
i=0
R−1
i )
−1

R−10
:
R−1
j
−R−1
j−1
:
R−1m −R−1m−1
Jm+1−Jave
Jm+1−Jave,mR
−1
m
0(NT−m−1)×1

where Jave,m is given by
Jave,m =
1
NT
Jmax
[
(m+ 1)−Rm
m∑
i=0
R−1i
]
(57)
The expected value of the game at the NE, as function of the
jammer’s average power, is given by
R
(
Jave
)
=
[
(m+ 1)−NT Jave
Jmax
]( m∑
i=0
R−1i
)−1
(58)
In this special case it can be shown that an upper bound for
jamming power threshold is given by
JTH,U =
1
2
NT+1
NT
(
1− RNTR0
)
Jmax <
1
2Jmax NT  1 (59)
and a simple strategy and an approximation to the jammer’s
optimal strategy that achieves this bound is given by
y˙T =
[
y˙0 y˙ · · · y˙
]
; y˙0 =
RNT
R0
and y˙ = 1− 1NT y˙0
(60)
Proof: Assume the jammer is using a mixed-strategy, y˙,
according to2
y˙ =

y0
y
...
y

(NT+1)×1
where
y0 = 1− 2NT
NT + 1
· Jave
Jmax
y =
2
NT + 1
· Jave
Jmax
(61)
It can easily be verified that y˙ ∈ YLE|Jave . Furthermore, assume
the transmitter is using an arbitrary mixed-strategy in which
the probability associated with the payoff Ri, 0 ≤ i ≤ NT
is denoted by xi. Define R(x, y˙) to be the expected payoff
of the game for the transmitter’s arbitrary mixed-strategy, x,
against jammer’s mixed-strategy defined in (61)
R(x, y˙) = R−i,NT +RNT xNT +Rixi Pr
[
J ≤ JT = Ji
]
(62)
where R−i,NT denotes the partial expected payoff resulting
from all pure strategies except for the i’th and NT ’th strategies.
In order to improve his payoff, the transmitter deviates from
his current strategy, x, to a new strategy, x′, where x′NT =
xNT + δ and x
′
i = xi − δ and 0 < δ. Define R(x′, y˙) to be
the expected payoff for the new strategy.
R(x′, y˙) =R−i,NT +RNT (xNT + δ)
+Ri (xi − δ) Pr
[
J ≤ JT = Ji
]
=R(x, y˙) + δ
[
RNT −Ri (y0 + iy)
] (63)
2We will use the term semi-uniform to refer to this class of pmf.
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Let ∆R be the difference in the expected payoff of the game
caused by deviating to the new strategy, i.e.,
∆R = R(x′, y˙)−R(x, y˙)
= δ
[
RNT −Ri
(
1− 2NT − i
NT + 1
· Jave
Jmax
)]
(64)
where δ > 0 and 0 ≤ i < NT . Assume (for now) that ∆R ≥ 0
then we can rewrite (64) as
Jave ≥ Jmax
(
1− RNTRi
)(
1
2
NT+1
NT−i
)
∆
= Ui (65)
Define JTH,U as
JTH,U = max
0≤i<NT
Jmax
(
1− RNTRi
)(
1
2
NT+1
NT−i
)
(66)
then for Jave > JTH and for all δ > 0 and 0 ≤ i < NT
the inequality in (65) is satisfied and hence ∆R > 0. As
a result, the transmitter can improve his payoff by dropping
the probability of his i’th strategy and adding it to his NT ’s
strategy (the strategy with the lowest payoff). Since the i’th
strategy was chosen arbitrary, the transmitter can improve his
expected payoff by dropping probability from all strategies,
except the NT ’th strategy, and adding them to the NT ’th
strategy. This process can be continued until all probabilities
are accumulated in xNT and no further improvement to the
expected payoff is possible.
In general, it can be shown that (66) is maximized for i = 0
(See Appendix A) which results in the desired upper bound
and the mixed-strategy given in (59) and (61), respectively.
The penalty in using the semi-uniform strategy instead of
the optimal mixed-strategy is that the jammer requires greater
jamming power to force the same expected NE.
Figure 4 (top) shows the expected transmission rate at
the NE as a function of the jammer’s average power for
typical values of PT , N, Jmax. The figure is sketched for four
different jammers; optimal strategic jammer, semi-uniform
jammer, reactive non-strategic jammer and random strategic
jammer (a jammer that uses a random mixed-strategy). As it
can be verified by Figure 4 (and numerical simulations) that
all non-optimal jamming strategies under-perform the optimal
Strategic jammer. Figure 4 (bottom), shows a typical optimal
mixed-strategy with the lowest average power that can force
Rmin at the NE. The randomization gain of this strategy is
Randomization Gain ≈ 2.9 = 4.6 dB (67)
VII. CONCLUSION
We formulated the interaction between an adaptive trans-
mitter (a transmitter with multiple transmission choices) and
a smart power limited jammer in a game theoretic context.
We showed that packetization and adaptivity benefits a smart
jammer. While the standard information-theoretic performance
results for a jammed channel corresponds to pure Nash equi-
librium, packetized adaptive communication leads to a lower
expected game value and a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Inspired by the Shannon’s capacity theorem, we defined a gen-
eral utility function and a payoff matrix which may be applied
to a variety of jamming problems. Furthermore, we showed
the existence of optimal mixed-strategy NE for the transmitter
and the jammer. We showed the existence of a threshold on
jammer’s average power such that if the jammer’s average
power exceeds this threshold then the expected value of the
game at NE corresponds to the transmitter’s lowest payoff; as
if the jammer was using the maximum jamming power all the
time. Finally, we studied an special case of optimal strategies
in a discrete-time AWGN wireless channel under jamming
and showed that randomization can significantly assist a smart
jammer with limited average power.
APPENDIX A
JAMMING THRESHOLD UPPER BOUND
In section (VI-B) we showed, without giving a proof, that
max
0≤i<NT
{
Ui
∆
=
(
1− RNTRi
)(
1
2
NT+1
NT−i
)
Jmax
}
= JTH,U (68)
where Ri and JTH,U are given by (55) and (59), respectively.
Proof: To show that (68) is true for all PT , N, Jmax,
Jave > 0 we need to show that Ui is indeed maximized for
i = 0. First, we rewrite Ui as
Ui =
1
2
Jmax
NT + 1
NT
1
1− iNT
(
1− RNT
Ri
)
; 0 ≤ i < NT
=
(
1
2
Jmax
NT + 1
NT
)
Jmax
Jmax − ( iNT Jmax)
(
1− RNT
Ri
)
(69)
define J and R(J) as
J =
(
i
NT
Jmax
)
0 ≤ i < NT
R(J) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N + J
)
0 ≤ J < Jmax
(70)
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substituting (70) in (69) and we have
U(J) =
(
1
2
Jmax
NT + 1
NT
)
Jmax
Jmax − J
[
1− R(Jmax)
R(J)
]
= a× Jmax
Jmax − J
[
1− R(Jmax)
R(J)
]
= a× F (J); where a > 0 and 0 ≤ J < Jmax
(71)
If F (J) in (71) were a decreasing function of J then Ui
and U(J) would also be decreasing functions of i and J
respectively. Let
F (J) = f(J)g(J) where
f(J) =
Jmax
Jmax − J
g(J) = 1− R(Jmax)
R(J)
(72)
For decreasing F (J) we have
∂
∂J
F = g
∂
∂J
f + f
∂
∂J
g < 0
f, g > 0 for 0 ≤ J < Jmax ⇒
∂
∂J f
f
< −
∂
∂J g
g
(73)
From (72) we have
−
∂
∂J g
g
=
1
N + J
×
(
x
1 + x
)(
log(1 + xm)
log(1 + x)
)
×
(
1
log(1 + x)− log(1 + xm)
)
∂
∂J f
f
=
P−1T xmx
x− xm
(74)
where
x =
PT
N + J
and xm =
PT
N + Jmax
and 0 < xm < x (75)
If we plug (74) and (75) in (73) and simplify the resulted
inequality we have
Z =x
−1
m x
1 + x
x− xm
log(1 + x)− log(1 + xm)
log(1 + xm)
log(1 + x)
> 1 for 0 < xm < x
(76)
We need to show that (76) holds for all 0 < xm < x. Notice
that
lim
x→x+m
Z ∼ x
−1
m log(1 + xm)
x−1 log(1 + x)
→ 1+ ∀ 0 < xm < x (77)
since we have used
d
dz
z−1 log(1 + z) < 0 ∀ 0 < z (78)
and the following natural logarithm property
z
1 + z
< log(1 + z) ≤ z for all z > 0 (79)
For simplicity we rewrite inequality in (76) as
Z2 = [x(x− xm) log(1 + xm)]
− [xm(1 + x) log(1 + x) (log(1 + x)− log(1 + xm))] > 0
(80)
As a result of (77) we have limx→x+m Z2 → 0+ for all 0 <
xm < x. Since (80) holds for x → x+m, if Z2 were a strictly
increasing function of x for all x > xm, (80) and (76) would
also hold as a corollary.
To show that Z2 is strictly increasing, we first verify that
∂Z2
∂x
(
x = xm
)
= 0 (81)
given that (81) is true, an alternative way to proceed is to
show that ∂Z2∂x is itself strictly increasing function of x (strictly
convex function of x). Define Z3
Z3 = ∂
2Z2
∂x2
× (1 + x) = 2 log(1 + xm)− 2xm+
2x log(1 + xm)− 2xm log(1 + x) + xm log(1 + xm)
(82)
It can be verified that for all x > xm and xm > 0 we
have limx→x+m Z3 > 0. Taking the partial derivate of Z3 with
respect to x and we have
∂Z3
∂x
= 2
[
log(1 + xm)− xm
1 + x
]
(83)
but from (79) we have
log(1 + xm) >
xm
1 + xm
>
xm
1 + x
for all x > xm
⇒ 2
[
log(1 + xm)− xm
1 + x
]
> 0 ∀x > xm > 0
(84)
and hence we have
∂Z3
∂x
> 0 for all x > xm > 0 (85)
Consequently, Z2 is indeed an increasing function of x for all
0 < xm < x. Taking the reverse steps that resulted in (80)
and (76) we can conclude that Ui in (68) is indeed a strictly
decreasing function of i and hence it is maximized for i = 0.
APPENDIX B
LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND CONSTRAINED TWO-PLAYER
ZERO-SUM GAMES
Consider a two-player zero-sum game in which, due to some
practical reason, not all mixed-strategies are feasible strategies
[38]. Assume the mixed-strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y
(player I’s and player II’s mixed-strategies respectively) must
be chosen from some hyper-polyhedron, i.e., from constraint
sets defined by linear inequalities and equalities. If we let Z
be the game matrix, player I’s problem is to find
max
x∈X
(
min
y∈Y
xZyT
)
(86)
where x and y are row vectors and the sets X and Y in the
most general case, are defined by
X :
{
xB ≤ c
x ≥ 0 Y :
{
yET ≥ f
y ≥ 0 (87)
Similarly, player II’s problem is to find
min
y∈Y
(
max
x∈X
xZyT
)
(88)
Consider the optimization problem in (86), the minimization
problem inside the parenthesis can be represented by a linear
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program whose objective function depends on x. From the
duality theorem [38] and if the program is feasible and
bounded, then the two programs
Minimize (xZ)yT subject to:
{
yET ≥ f
y ≥ 0 (89)
and
Maximize zfT subject to:
{
zE ≤ xZ
z ≥ 0 (90)
will have the same value (where z is an auxiliary variable).
If we plug the dual program (90) in (86), player I’s problem
becomes a pure maximization problem, i.e
Maximize zfT subject to:

zE − xZ ≤ 0
xB ≤ c
x, z ≥ 0
(91)
This problem can be solved by the usual linear program
algorithms i.e, simplex algorithm. In a similar way, it can be
shown that player II’s problem could be reduced to a pure
minimization problem, i.e.
Minimize csT subject to:

sBT − yZT ≥ 0
yET ≥ f
y, s ≥ 0
(92)
where s is an auxiliary variable. It can be verified that the
program (92) is the dual of the program (91) and therefore, if
both are feasible and bounded, they will have the same value
and the constrained game will have a NE in mixed-strategies.
By using appropriate set of matrices and vectors, we can
reformulate Transmitter’s and jammer’s strategy constraint sets
defined in Section III-A into the general format introduced
in (87). Specifically, consider the transmitter’s constraint set,
the following set of matrix, B, and vector, c, can be used to
represent transmitter’s constraint set;
B(NT+1)×2 =
[
1T(NT+1)×1 −1T(NT+1)×1
]
(93)
c1×2 =
[
1 −1] (94)
similarly, jammer’s constraint set can be represented by the
following matrix, E, and vector, c,
ET(NT+1)×3 =[
1T(NT+1)×1 −1T(NT+1)×1 −JT(NT+1)×1
]
(95)
f1×3 =
[
1 −1 −Jave
]
(96)
From (91) and (96) the maximization program objective func-
tion becomes
z · fT = z1 − z2 − Javez3 (97)
To show that the maximization program is bounded and
feasible and hence has a solution in mixed-strategies, we need
to show that the objective function, given in (97), is bounded
and the constraint set defined by the set of matrices and vectors
in (93)-(96) is non-empty. Assume, for now, that the objective
function is unbounded, we must have
z1 − z2 − Javez3 > Zmax = max
i,j
Zij (98)
for some z = [z1 z2 z3] ≥ 0 that satisfy the constraints in
(91). Consider the first inequality in (91), multiplying vectors
z and x by the first column of matrices E and Z results in
z1 − z2 − J0z3 − xZ:,1 ≤ 0
⇒ z1 − z2 ≤ xZ:,1 ≤ Zmax = max
i
Zi,1
⇒ Zmax ≥ z1 − z2 (99)
where Z:,1 denotes the first column of Z and by assumption
we have J0 = 0. Plugging (99) in (98) results in z3 < 0
which is in contradiction with z > 0. As a result, the objective
function cannot be greater than Zmax and hence the program
is bounded. To show that the constraint set is non-empty, we
need to show that there exists at least one pair of (x, z) that
satisfies the constraints in (91). From the first inequality in
(91) we must have
z1 − z2 − Jiz3 ≤ xZ:,i ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ NT + 1 (100)
but 0 ≤ xZ:,i ≤ Zmax for 1 ≤ i ≤ NT + 1 and for all
probability vectors x, therefore if we let
z1 − z2 − Jiz3 ≤ 0 (101)
then (100) would be satisfied for all 1 ≤ i ≤ NT +1. Choosing
z3 = 0 and letting 0 < z1 < z2 satisfies the inequality (101)
and as a result the transmitter’s constraint set is nonempty.
Therefore, the transmitter’s maximization program is feasi-
ble and bounded and has a solution. As a result of the duality
theorem, the dual of this program, jammer’s minimization
problem, is also feasible and bounded has the same solution
(NE in mixed-strategies).
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